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Abstract: The solving of tensions between judicial naturalism and positivism may lead to conciliation 
and finally to their rapprochement in a judicial interpretation area. They seem to lead to a greater 
number of common results in the judicial interpretation domain regarding a real convergence between 
diverse conceptions of different author or referring to an agreement on a common interest or to a 
combination between the two variants. From this perspective a judicial interpretation can be qualified 
as being partial or arbitrary. The principles of interpretation have, mainly, a functional nature. They 
contain, on one part, an ontological basis, ensured by general law principles, configured from a 
functional and in a technological-methodological point of view. On the other side, the principles of 
interpretation, regardless their involvement from an organic point of view can be involved in norm 
application, without taking a normative form. If they obtain a formal-normative investment they lose 
their main nature, transforming into norms, but we must have to mention the fact that, the principle 
guides, enlightens, it does not obligate. They represent values, expressed into ideas, desires, but not 
norms, because these ones build on principles.  
Keywords: normative demands, interdependence, duality, empirical disagreements, theoretical 
disagreements 
 
1.  Interpretative debates regarding the problem of autonomy of positive law in 
connection to natural law and the principles that govern it 
 
The connection between positive law, the principles that govern it and natural law, 
together with its principles, intervenes in the connection with the research of the 
foundation of positive law and its autonomy on the basis of a certain limitation. The 
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duality of law was strongly studied by jurists who tried to offer solution in the matter 
of the distinction between natural law and positive law. 
A first aspect to be discussed refers to the foundation of the idea of positive law, as 
it was exposed and sustained by Kerhuel, idea that is sustained not only on the 
rejection of any reference to the principles of natural law (Kerhuel, 2007, pp. 292-
300), but also, on the obeying of the freedom of speech right. Thus the author has 
affirmed the fact that the idea of positive law is not justified by the principles of 
natural law. We access this point of view, knowing the fact that certain positivist or 
existentialist currents understand positive law by excluding any references to natural 
law. 
Judicial positivism denies any reference to an ideal in justice or to any source of law 
that would impose in its positive reality. According to the opinions shared by 
scholars of Kerhuel’s theory and reasoning, there is no other law than the codified 
one. 
To the opposite pole, positive law and natural law represent two law orders, the 
development of is realized through a reciprocal interaction. 
The articulations observed between them result from an essential contribution of the 
natural law principles to positive law, and reciprocally, the role of positive law in the 
understanding and accepting of natural law principles in social life. Positive law 
appeals to the natural law principles in order to attenuate its own deficiencies, in this 
position not existing in the service of justice, but in the measure of its conformity to 
natural principles. 
These hold an essential role in searching and guaranteeing an ideal in justice, 
underlining the essential contribution of natural law to positive law, which result 
from the fact that positive law extracts its lawfulness and if compulsory force from 
the principles of natural law. When we observe a possible difference between the 
terms of positive law and those of the natural law, the positive law must be 
interpreted according to natural law, in the terms of positive law. The readjustment 
of positive law to natural law is the result of a regulations unity and to the fact that 
natural law prevails; the limiting to the terms of positive law there is an exigency of 
formalization.  
The interpretation is not only present in different area of activity, but it also 
structures different domains or it formulates modalities under which they are 
presented (law or other sociologic sciences) (Eremia, 1998, p. 1). 
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It gains through law new coordinates, determined on one side by the legislator and 
on the other side by the judge’s activity, the judicial domain being the one that offers 
to interpretation special characteristics that allow not only the manifest of reason and 
of human intelligence, but also the their expression in a determinate social frame 
(Popa, 1992, p. 173), as professor Nicolae Popa sustains. 
A judicial interpretation refers not only to the analysis of judicial area, but also of 
those that once entered into the reality component, have relevance for positive law 
(Troper, 2001, p. 72).  
According to a general definition, law refers to a just order that consists in a certain 
equality loomed between reciprocal report of individuals and social group. Certain 
authors refer to natural law (Gurvitch, 1933) as to „the idea of a necessary 
regulation of any positive law” (Leonard, 1991, pp. 268-269), idea that approaches 
the identification of natural law as „an intuitive positive law”. This idea is also seen 
in Kant’s writings for who the expression „intuitive positive law” refers to a notion 
the objective content of which cannot discern an exhaustive and definitive manner, 
considered to be necessary and prior to the demarche prosecuted. (Kant, 1994, p. 54) 
The language used by Kant allows  the idea of a just order integration, anterior to 
positive law, which represents in this case an indispensable basis of law, without 
being transposed into reality in an immediate and complete manner. 
The interdependence of the two law orders can not lead to the conclusion according 
to which what is admitted in a legal manner, it is de facto according to the principles 
of natural law. If all regulations are presumed to contribute to the realization of 
common good, it doesn’t mean that all these are according to natural law, creating 
situations when the law tolerates, without sanctioning, contrary situations to natural 
law. (Jestaz, 1990, p. 528)  For example, if an injustice is not qualified as being a 
crime, the judge cannot punish it, even if it can be punished through natural law. 
Positive law extracts its moral force from natural law, the latter one being able to 
sustain itself, in an independent manner from the existence of civil law and outside 
any connection to an organized and recognized judicial system. According to the 
example of all humanist conceptions, natural law aspires to its contour in a shape 
with roots in positive law. (Aillet, 1993, pp. 51-52) 
The legislator has predicted correctly, in a presumptive way, starting from natural 
law, a certain number of principles or fundamental rights, some with value of 
constitutional principle, fact which offered them a supreme value in judicial norms 
hierarchy, in which the state has the role of a values guarantor and for democracy 
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itself. (Del Vecchio, 1979, p. 92) Building, in a social field, the principles of natural 
law, positive law attenuates the deficient in the knowledge of natural law, whose 
meaning, subjected to different interpretations, may be dissolved in a variety of 
individual, social and historical interpretation. We may sustain the fact that the 
principles of natural law are expressed in a coherent and unified manner, only with 
the hand of positive law. “When there is no relation with what was established and 
known, when it is about a totally new fact, the problem of natural law principles is 
raised. If the legislators’ providing is limited, nature is infinite and applies to 
everything that interests people” (Bobbio, 1965, p. 76). 
Still, it is certain that natural law and positive law complete each other, positive law 
offering to natural law a part of its essence and getting in its turn an opening towards 
authenticity, fact which creates an independence report between them, without 
leading towards a proper assimilation. 
Positive laws represent the result of free choice of concrete and contingent means for 
the prediction of natural law in judicial order, thus constituting, a practical condition 
of a natural law which enjoys in its turn of a social efficiency.  
For the sustainers of sociologic positivism, the foundations of laws is found in social 
relations, having as purpose the evolution of human’s mentality, thus contributing to 
the normalization of more human’s behavior or opinion, regardless any exterior 
principle. 
According to other opinions, any referring to natural justice, by adopting an 
interpretation conform to judicial positivism, according to which a constitutional 
decision must be founded on the principle of hierarchical superiority of the latter, is 
refused1. The debates in this case have their origin in the past as it results from the 
decisions of the United States Supreme Court, mainly the case Calder vs. Bull.2 This 
aspect is applied in order to realize a just and efficacy equilibrium between unity and 
diversity. The tension between naturalism and positivism may represent a source of 
instability. Naturalism cannot guarantee impartiality, while positivism cannot avoid 
arbitrary. The lack of impartiality of naturalism has its source in the incapacity to 
formulate neutral interpretation in connection to any of the competitive conception. 
                                                 
1
 Case Calder vs Bull. 
2
 Calder vs Bull was one of the first constitutional decisions debated by the USA Supreme Court, 
regarding constitutional limits regarding governmental power. The legislator from Connecticut has 
pronounced a resolution of allowing a hearing during a trial. Calder, disappointed by his inheritants, 
has contested this action as a breach of the interdiction in article I, point 10 on the reason ex post facto 
legis. 
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Examining the assertions of the authors presented in this paper, I believe that, in this 
context, we cannot speak of an influence of natural law on positive law or about a 
conditioning from the part of positive law over the natural law, but more of a mutual 
intake essential to the evolution of the two domains in order to search – without 
exhaustion – of an ideal in justice. 
The law must benefit from an absolute autonomy, independently from the exterior 
principles, in the context in which positive law affirms as an absolute starting point. 
The autonomy of positive law is considered autonomy based in the respect of the 
freedom of speech, because, in the frame of a democratic regime, the legislator has 
to obligation to protect and to respect the autonomy of individual consciousness. 
Still, I consider that a too radical autonomy between positive law and natural law 
seems to have certain limits that are seen not only in the search of the law 
foundation, but also in what refers to the reduction in actuality of the objectivity 
criterion, which constitutes the guarantee of absolute neutrality. 
In face of positivist radicalism what denies the existence of any natural foundation; a 
demarche may take place that ends with the apparition of a principle which was 
anterior considered positive law. 
 
2.  Particularities of judicial interpretation principles in Ronald Dworkin’s 
theory 
 
The main field of debates between different theory schools of law belongs to the 
interpretative space. The jurists reasoning, either they are theoreticians or 
practicians, centers on solving different problems regarding: judicial decision, 
relation between law and moral, the problem of normative system lagoons etc. 
Explaining the evolution of judicial order through their way of taking shape and 
their internal history, implies a priority task and in the same time, a challenge for the 
law general theory. (Pfersmann, April - June 2002, p. 282) 
Dworkin’s theories have opened a new field of reflection on a functional reflection 
between principles and law, thus configuring a global network that results between 
principles, complex elements of the judicial system and positive law. For Dworkin, 
law does not represent but the means through which we each principles, reminding e 
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G. Vedel used to call “judicial gangway”, making references to the content of 
positive law. 
  According to the opinion of this author, the principles of interpretation do not 
represent an arbitrary work because they are extracted from positive law, thus 
allowing the discovery of law in general and in particular the solution to which the 
judge – interpret reached in difficult cases. Thus, law becomes the median point 
between different sentences: moral, political, ethical, economic, all brought together 
and crystallized in principles of interpretation put to the service of the interpret 
principle of the system, the judge. 
Dworkin has a proper and original name for the judge – interpret, calling him 
“Hercules” due to the superhuman work volume that he accomplishes, in order to 
shape through his decision a new interpretation, but a logical, developmental and 
normative one of the judicial system. The judge – interpret has to obey all principles 
in order to obtain an ideal in justice: “the sufficient reason”, “perfection”, 
“democratic society”, and “existential constitutional demands”. 
These are simple sentences for some authors, but true principles, towards which the 
transformation into procedures of laws does not fulfill its mission. Rawls proposes 
in the center of his doctrine the notion of equitability, which involves other tow 
basic principles for the search of an ideal in justice: the principle of equality (equal 
rights with freedoms) and the principle of difference (which underlined the 
elimination of inequalities and the obtaining of equality chances). These two 
principles dominate and in the same time represent the basic structure of society. 
(Rawls, 1993, p. 200) 
Dworkin has formulated an interesting theory about the American judicial system 
which may be extended, in my opinion, to order national systems.  
I consider that the problem regarding the reception of Dworkin’s theory, mainly of 
his theory regarding principles, supposes and opening towards a so called 
“sociologic law”, which leaves an extra freedom for the judge in interpreting 
positive law. In his vision, the interpreter must understand must understand the 
political and social reality of society, without mentioning law in an autonomous 
manner. Also, the interpreter has the obligation not to complete discretionary law 
and not to apply in practice only the norms of an etatic law system, as Kelsen 
proposes.  
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The unity of internal judicial order, in Kelsen’s opinion results from the fact that the 
validity of a norm is tied to another norm and is sustained by it, the creation of the 
latter one is regulated by norms which represent in their turn the basis of its validity. 
(Kelsen, 2000, p. 58) We observe that his theory shifts away from conceptualist and 
logic positivism, the partisans of which are Austin, Jellinek, Hart and Perelman. 
According to Dworkin’s theory, a judicial phenomenon must be understood as being 
developmental through what the principles shape, what sustains an interpretative 
horizon.  
We may thus conclude, the idea according to which, the text of a normative act must 
be the object of a constructive interpretation, so that the text, its lecture, the law 
reality and the interpretation of the law reality to be able to represent axes of a study 
made on a original work in a historical judicial plan, because it aims at the 
elimination of any distinction between text (structure) and lecture. This system in 
which laws are being taken seriously, supposes “an attitude of interpreting law”, 
conceived as “a concept of interpretation”, so that a practical interpretation can 
support on the existence and the spreading of its results in a “system of principles”. 
(Kitaeff, 2007, pg. 305-308) But, in the same time, interpretative practice must 
represent the object of putting “a judicial order” in a “narrative coherence”. 
(Lenoble, 1988, pg. 121-139) 
Reticent to the idea that a judicial order is not build only of norms, in which we can 
distinguish main norms from secondary ones (according to Hart’s opinion), Dworkin 
build a new theory regarding „constructive” interpretation, which completes the 
functioning of law theories care with the fact that, through its reasoning principles 
receive a characteristic arguing method. 
Judicial norms, standards of compulsory conduit, have an especially important role 
in the law system frame. But law is not complete, according to Dworkin’s opinion, if 
it is build only of norms and is subjected to a subjective interpretation. Law 
understood as an interpretation concept, also keeps in mind values, maintaining, in 
the same time the interpreter in an internal coherence of the system, through the 
principles shifts that direct it. 
Dworkin’s distinction between rules (norms) and principles is not confounded with 
the distinction established by Hart between main and secondary rules. A judicial 
order represents a logical system – analyzable according to conventions of semantics 
and syntax – different from the value system. But, a society where we meet only 
rules considered standards of compulsory conduit, doesn’t have a law.  
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Law is built starting with the moment in which main rules, considered norms which 
impose obligations, are guaranteed and organized by secondary rules, which 
attribute competencies and allow the offering of validity to main rules.  
In Hart’s theories, these judicial rules must derive from the recognition norm. 
Unlike kelsian normativism, this does not represent a logical-deductive norm, but a 
consensual and empirical acceptance of the main norms by its addresses. 
Recognition norm, in Hart’s opinion, cannot be considered valid or invalid, because 
if offers conditions of validity to all norms that compose a judicial system, 
representing its basis. The author turns over the construction of Kelsen’s pyramid, in 
order to sustain the fact that recognition norms do not represent a presupposition, 
nor a fiction but a social fact. (Billier, 2001, p. 207) 
I believe that the recognition norm, which Hart speaks of, does not represent a 
postulate of integral recognition of the top judicial system, but a norm found at its 
basis; because a collective existence supposes an empirical acceptance of an 
obedience to law rules.  
Dworkin considers that and adaptation of interpretation principles to the rule 
proposed by Hart is impossible, because it cannot form from an ensemble of 
principles. According to this solution, offered by Dworkin, a tautology arises: “law 
is law”, fact which results from the theoreticians desire to mention all existent 
principles, so that if we propose ourselves to inventory them, our action would fail 
because they would represent the object of new controversies (Pfersmann, 2001, pp. 
22-30). 
 Another contradiction, influenced by Hart’s theory, resided in the measure in which 
this knows a great influence in an Anglo-Saxon world, Dworkin considered that law 
does not represent but an ensemble of judicial rules whose validity is appreciated 
according to what is called “a test of identifying the origin of norms”. (Pfersmann, 
2001, p. 31) The author of the work „Prendre les droit au serieux” (Dworkin, 1995, 
p. 79), presents law as an ensemble of rules and principles, considering principles as 
being prior to the application of law due to their global character of spreading in the 
society and in judicial texts. Where Hart believes that the judge disposes of a 
discretionary power, Dworkin sees in principles the „antithesis” of discretionary 
power. The idea of moral truth, independent from a judicial system, based on the 
intuition of basic values, also deductible ones, is today protected by the Australian 
professor John Finnis, who opposing skeptics, considers that principles, which refer 
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to the value of life or to the  priority of human beings, may represent the starting 
point for a judicial reasoning. (Finnis, 1980, p. 45) 
For Dworkin the distinction between judicial principles and law norms is a logical 
one. This ensemble of standards impose particular decisions in the domain of 
judicial obligations, being applicable in the style “all or nothing”. Thus, if the facts 
that a norm stipulated are produces, either that norms is valid, case in which the 
answer it offers must be accepted, or it is invalid, case in which it contributes with 
nothing to that decision. (Dworkin, 1995, p. 82) We may mention the fact that a 
norm is more important than another in a functional plan, because if plays a more 
important role in regulating behaviors, the same thing is not possible at the level of 
normative systems.  
For Dworkin a judicial reasoning represents a constructive interpretation (Dworkin, 
1994, pp. 273-278) of the law as integrity, this being the most efficient model, after 
the conventional and the pragmatic one, capable to get in the American judicial 
system. Starting from this concept, Dworkin builds its own definition of law, 
distinguishing these way empirical disagreements from theoretical ones. 
Empirical disagreements on law represent daily events met by a jurist in his 
activity. The problem that appears is to know is such a normative disposition is 
contained by a law or the other, fact which does not represent anything else but the 
contingent notions that is not capable of  bringing interpretation differences, being 
sufficient to report to a certain text in order to find the answer. 
Theoretical disagreements serve Dworkin in order to explain his vision of the law 
and of the origin of the interpretation concept. Thus, a judicial sentence in a 
dworkinian sense, that anyone’s affirmation, either of a judge’s affirmation, part 
public agent, part simple citizen, regarding the existence of law, supposes a 
reference to a source of validity on which this sentence is based on. Next the 
problem regarding finding out what could constitute a grounds of law is met, fact for 
which a theoretical disagreement does not refer to the existence of the fact 
considered to be a founding one, but on the ground value, and this represents the 
function of quality interpretation proposed this way by judicial practice 
Courtesy rules of an imaginary community serve Dworkin in establishing an analogy 
with judicial rules. He considers that these courtesy rules are obeyed without anyone 
asking himself about their lawfulness or their souse. Later, an interpretative attitude 
got member of the community to think, they have begun to ask themselves about the 
ground of these norms and of a deeper meaning.   
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Their answers represent the start of interpreting courtesy rules. Thus, the participants 
to social practice will develop a “creative interpretation” which can be considered a 
“constructive interpretation”. Unlike conversational interpretation, a constructive 
interpretation will seek to elaborate conditions for recognizing the system at a 
purpose level and at its potential level. Francoise Michaut considers that a creative 
interpretation implies an internal point of view from the participant. (Michaut, 1988, 
p. 113) 
In the dworkinian view of the law, the judge doesn’t have a discretionary power, 
what the author denotes thorough the collocation „droit-integrite”, fact which 
represents the way in which he describes law as “an interpretation concept” (Millard, 
4th series 2000, p. 13). The consequence appears in the fact that the authority for the 
application of rules is dependent on judicial order, starting from this it consecrates to 
interpretation, to its history, moral and finally but not laws to the principles of 
interpretation. 
The solution to be imposed is conform to the principles if a judicial system consists 
in finding one answer resulted from the demarche made – one right answer. The use 
by the judge of the principles of the law system can be subjective, but this 
subjectivity is framed by the necessary connection of the interpret to the unity of the 
system in order to find the best solution that should, equally, keep in mind the 
opinions of other judges and that of the rule of precedent. This framing of 
interpretation by principles comes from a consensus of a proper judicial practice of 
common law  
Listing to the practice of interpretation regarding the agreement on the meaning of 
law for the positive judicial order, the judge contributed in this way to the collective 
history of principles which have an ontological and a methodological character.  
In Dworkin’s opinion, the landmarks of this interpretative practice represent 
“judicial paradigms”. These are qualified as axioms of the judicial system base, 
having as consequence a suspect consideration of the result of any interpretation 
which is not conform. They alloy the realization of a “normative form of arguing”, 
thus proceeding to a confrontation of interpretation to a paradigm that it cannot be 
explained. Paradigms represent. Limits, but in the same time they may represent the 
base of a judicial system having the purpose to mark the interpreter’s arguing 
normative form, that is to offer coherence to the interpretation concept which 
represents the constitutive element of law. Masking these paradigms has as 
consequence the interpreter’s dis-credibility.  
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For us, judicial paradigms represent unique rules of the judicial system and their 
identification, together with the judge’s discretionary power leads to the definition 
of constructive interpretation.  
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